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Microgrids are an increasingly popular means of making a smaller, smarter, 
cleaner, and more resilient energy grid. When Superstorm Sandy hit the 
northeast states, a few microgrids continued to provide their constituents with 
energy for weeks while the rest of the grid was down. Microgrids typically 
involve small-scale energy generation coupled with nearby storage and 
distribution, and are connected to, but capable of disconnecting from, the 
macrogrid during a power outage. 
 
This Comment will analyze the economics of microgrids, focusing on the neces-
sity of effective cost-benefit analyses. In order to allow for the development of 
microgrids, regulators should create appropriate mechanisms for microgrid 
developers to recover the costs of development and operation. However, when 
incentivizing microgrid development, regulators must remain focused on 
maintaining an optimal market for consumers, by accounting for the net utility 
provided by the microgrid. The benefits and costs of microgrids must be quanti-
fied both when planning specific microgrid projects and when creating regulatory 
frameworks. The efficacy of energy policy relative to microgrids will turn on the 
accuracy of the cost-benefit analysis used by regulators and developers. 
 
This Comment will begin by introducing what microgrids are, their costs, 
benefits, barriers, the driving forces behind their development, and some notable 
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microgrid success stories. Part I will describe the present uncertainty around 
microgrid regulation and discuss the need to introduce specific microgrid 
legislation/regulation to increase certainty. Part II will discuss modern 
attempts to evaluate the costs and benefits of microgrids and the importance of 
further developing cost-benefit analyses. Part III will address how microgrids 
fit into typical laws governing public utilities. Part IV will discuss how states 
should regulate and incentivize microgrid development, with greater or lesser 
emphasis on market efficiency. This portion will also analyze creative uses of 
rate-making to intelligently encourage microgrid development. Lastly, Part V 
will address a means of fitting energy storage, and through it, microgrids, into 
wholesale markets, thereby adding an important source of cost recovery to 
microgrid developers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
	
 Microgrids trace their origins to the 1880s, the first one being Edison’s 
Manhattan microgrid, supplying light to 59 homes using Edison bulbs and newly 
installed grid infrastructure.1 As our transmission technology improved and 
society became environmentally conscious, power generation moved away from 
cites, where electricity was predominantly consumed.2 Around the same time, 
states developed franchise laws to ensure cost recovery for public utilities and to 
protect consumers with rate regulation and other oversight. 
 
A. Defining a Microgrid 
 
The Department of Energy defines a microgrid as “a group of inter-
connected loads and distributed energy resources (DER) within clearly defined 
electrical boundaries that act as a single controllable entity with respect to the 
grid. A microgrid can connect and disconnect from the grid to enable it to 
operate in both grid-connected and island-mode.”3 One challenge facing 
microgrids is the lack of definition within state law. The few states that do 
define microgrids do so differently. Defining is an integral step in regulating 
and encouraging microgrids.  
DER, seen in the definition above, is defined by Massachusetts as “a 
device or measure that produces electricity or reduces electricity consumption, 
and is connected to the electrical system, either ‘behind the meter’ in the 
customer’s premise, or on the utility’s primary distribution system. A DER can 
include, but is not limited to, energy efficiency, distributed generation, demand 
response, microgrids, energy storage, energy management systems, and 
electric vehicles.”4 New York and California have very similar definitions. To 
narrow in even further, “[d]istributed generation, also known as on-site 
generation or distributed energy, refers to the production of electricity by a 
small-scale source located at or very near the end users it serves.”5 
																																								 																				
1 RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS TASK FORCE, RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS 8 
(2014) (exploring the early history of microgrids in New York). 
2 Id. (discussing the historical trend towards out of city power generation). 
3 Microgrid Definitions, MICROGRIDS AT BERKLEY LAB, https://building-microgrid.lbl.gov/ 
microgrid-definitions [https://perma.cc/6ZEZ-RYYY] (last visited Jan. 20, 2019) (describing 
microgrids as having the capability of connecting to power grids or operating independently). 
4 NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF REGULATORY UTILITY COMMISSIONERS, NARUC MANUAL ON 
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES RATE DESIGN AND COMPENSATION 43 (2016) (defining 
distributed energy resources under Massachusetts law) [hereinafter “NARUC”].  
5 Sara C. Bronin, Curbing Energy Sprawl with Microgrids, 43 CONN. L. REV. 547, 559 
(2010) (defining distributed generation, also known as on-site generation). 
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To summarize, microgrids are relatively small energy systems, typically 
including small-scale generation, storage, and consumption, which can separate 
from the grid to feed specific consumers with resilient energy. “When the 
[microgrid] disconnects from the centralized grid, the islanded area transitions 
from redundant infrastructure to the primary power source. . . .”6 Utilities have 
in the past objected to non-utility owned microgrids and distributed generation, 
expressing concerns about technology feasibility and safety.7 Commentators 
argue that national safety standards and interconnection technology have made 
these arguments less viable.8 However, a 2014 survey by Accenture found that 
a majority of utility company executives believed revenue would fall between 
now and 2030, and microgrids would impact this revenue reduction.9 While 
certain states have taken the initiative to integrate microgrids into the current 
energy distribution system, many states are held back by pervasive regulatory 
uncertainty and the inherent tension between traditional franchised utilities and 
disruptive microgrid technology. 
Microgrids can be confused with many related modern developments in 
the grid. For instance, “[b]oth [smart grids and microgrids] may use the same 
technology, and often incorporat[e] DG and energy storage, or include customer-
focused technologies such as smart meters.”10 An important distinction is that 
smart grids encourage reform from the top down while microgrids provide 
bottom up changes to the grid. Another example, nanogrids, are one form of a 
microgrid, and feature “a single backup generator, perhaps with energy storage, 
to support minimal building operations when the larger grid goes down. These 
nanogrids are small, usually  under 100 kilowatts.”11 
																																								 																				
6 Kevin B. Jones et al., The Urban Microgrid: Smart Legal and Regulatory Policies to 
Support Electric Grid Resiliency and Climate Mitigation, 41 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1695, 1702 
(2014). 
7 Bronin, supra note 5, at 569 (noting and criticizing past objections to microgrids by utility 
companies). 
8 See id. (arguing that utility fears of fires starting due to microgrids supplying a shutdown 
grid are null due to islanding technology, other interconnection fears can be assuaged by 
reputable standards for distributed generation interconnection have been developed, and new 
technology protects against degradation of power quality). 
9 Heather Payne, A Tale of Two Solar Installations: How Electricity Regulations Impact 
Distributed Generation, 38 U. HAW. L. REV. 131, 171 (2016) (citing Jack Azagury et al., 
How Can Utilities Survive Energy Demand Disruption?, ACCENTURE 2 (2014)).  
10 ELECTRIC POWER RESEARCH INSTITUTE, PROGRAM ON TECHNOLOGY INNOVATION: 
MICROGRID IMPLEMENTATIONS: LITERATURE REVIEW 1-2 (Jan. 2016) (identifying a basis 
for the conflation of microgrids and smart grids) [hereinafter “EPRI”]. 
11 MATT GRIMLEY & JOHN FARRELL, INSTITUTE FOR LOCAL SELF-RELIANCE, MIGHTY 
MICROGRIDS 6 (2016) (noting the small energy capacity of nanogrids). 
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As of 2015 Microgrids generated 1.3 gigawatts of capacity, 0.1% of 
total US electric generation capacity.12 In North America, microgrid capacity 
is growing at 44% per year and globally at 70%.13 However, in the United 
States 80% of operational microgrids are located in just seven states.14 In the 
U.S. microgrids are built by six different entities, with 10% being built by 
utilities, 15% by military installations, 25% by universities/research facili-
ties/hospitals, 12% by cities/public institutions, 20% by commercial and 
industrial complexes, and 18% by remote locations.15 Projects with utility 
involvement range from pilot projects to fully operational microgrids with rate 
based recovery. Ownership of this utility model would benefit from a higher 
degree of coordination between users and utilities; this could be established by 
a hybrid utility/user ownership of the model. 
 
B. Value Added with Microgrid Development 
	
Microgrids are encouraged largely for their ability to add reliability 
and resiliency to the grid, as well as their ability to integrate DER, reduce 
emissions, protect critical facilities, save money for customers, and reduce 
infrastructure investment. Recently, additional interest has stemmed from 
cheaper renewables, integration technology, and opportunities for microgrids 
to expand into wholesale energy markets. New York State, in its cost-benefit 
analysis manual (discussed later), outlines microgrid revenue streams, 
including energy benefits (energy cost savings and capacity cost savings), 
reliability benefits, power quality benefits, and environmental benefits.16 The 
manual notes that offsetting the above benefits are costs which include initial 
design and planning expenses, capital investments, operation and mainten-
ance, and environmental costs.17 
Regulators should encourage the making of an efficient energy 
market, which would provide the most value to the consumer. In order to do 
this, regulators must make the development of microgrids cost effective 
																																								 																				
12 Id. at 7 (stating the total energy production of microgrids in the United States). 
13 JOHN CALDWELL, EDISON ELECTRIC INSTITUTE, UTILITY BUSINESS MODELS FOR 
MICROGRIDS (last visited Jan. 23, 2019) (delineating global trends in microgrid capacity). 
14 GRIMLEY & FARRELL, supra note 11, at 7 (noting the concentrated distribution of 
microgrids within seven states). 
15 CALDWELL, supra note 13. 
16 INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS, INC., ASSESSING THE BENEFITS AND COSTS OF DEVELOPING A 
MICROGRID: MODEL USER’S GUIDE 13 (2015) (identifying the multitude of benefits 
associated with microgrids according to the state of New York). 
17 Id. at 5 (identifying potential costs of microgrids according to the state of New York). 
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through allowing the owners of beneficial microgrids to recover costs to an 
appropriate degree (this could be accomplished through rate-making, access 
to wholesale markets, charging non-benefiting consumers, or other means). 
Insufficient research has been done quantifying the economic value of grid 
resilience. While survivability is a highly valuable trait, at a certain point 
adding resiliency becomes uneconomical, and proper investigation into the 
value of resilience should be undertaken. A case study in Broome County, 
NY showed that for the microgrid to be cost effective, meaning that it 
provides a net benefit, there must be 17 days or more per year without 
power.18 “Amazingly, these case studies have had no discernable impact upon 
the microgrid bandwagon.”19 
Reformative energy grid legislation typically arises in response to 
weather induced outages (such as in Connecticut, New Jersey, and New 
York)20 and is potentially infused with an overzealous and uneconomical 
desire to create grid resilience.21 Any cost-benefit analysis of microgrids 
would be incomplete without looking at probable outage days per year and 
the recaptured value provided by resilience. 
 
C. The Resiliency Appeal of a Microgrid 
 
The capability of a microgrid to maintain operations while discon-
nected from the main grid can be tremendously important during extreme 
weather.22 Superstorm Sandy was the second costliest storm to ever hit the 
United States, causing $66 billion in damage and 159 deaths.23 “The storm 
spanned almost one thousand miles in breadth, and its intensity caused a 
																																								 																				
18 Steve Huntoon, Microgrids: Where's the Beef?, PUBLIC UTILITIES FORTNIGHTLY 1, 11 
(Nov. 2015), http://www.energy-counsel.com/docs/Microgrids-Wheres-the-Beef-Fortnight 
ly-November2015.pdf (criticizing the high rate of downtime necessary to make microgrids 
cost effective). 
19 Id. (asserting that the evidence of inefficiency of microgrids has not tempered popular 
enthusiasm for them). 
20 See discussion infra Part IV. 
21 PETER H. LARSEN ET AL., LAWRENCE BERKLEY NATIONAL LABORATORY, ASSESSING 
CHANGES IN THE RELIABILITY OF THE U.S. ELECTRIC POWER SYSTEM 37 (2015), https://emp. 
lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-188741.pdf (finding no clear correlation between increased spend-
ing and greater reliability). 
22 See generally, Jones et al., supra note 6 (repeatedly noting the utility of microgrids during 
extreme weather events). 
23 James M. Van Nostrand, Keeping the Lights on during Superstorm Sandy: Climate Change 
Adaptation and the Resiliency Benefits of Distributed Generation, 23 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 92, 
94 (2015) (stating the financial and human costs of Hurricane Sandy). 
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fourteen-foot storm surge at Battery Park in lower Manhattan—a surge that 
exceeded previous storm tides by over three feet.”24 Approximately 8.5 
million utility customers lost power on the east coast.25  
Not all communities lost power as a result of Sandy. “With a 15 megawatt 
(MW) combined heat and power generator as well as 5.3 MW of solar, Princeton 
University’s microgrid kept its campus live for three days while power was cut 
during Hurricane Sandy.”26 In Long Island, South Oaks Hospital was segregated 
from the grid for fifteen days after Sandy, relying on 1.25 MW from its combined 
heat and power generator and 47 KW of solar.27 This 245 bed healthcare facility 
took on patients from other sites that lost power during the storm.28 
During the summer of 2013, in southern California, the Borrego 
Springs microgrid successfully islanded during brownouts to provide cooling 
zones during periods of intense heat.29 During a planned outage in 2015, it also 
became the first microgrid to rely on solar and storage.30 These two examples 
provide a certain comfort to the human need for resiliency and consistency, but 
do little in the way of proving viability based on cost-benefit models. 
 
D. Regulatory Environment and Framework 
	
Present regulatory barriers make it difficult for microgrid developers 
to recover costs.31 Many states require that an entity be labeled an electricity 
marketer or public utility in order to sell electricity to others.32 Although 
interconnection with the main grid can be non-standard, and objected to by 
																																								 																				
24 Id. 
25 Id. (noting the mass number of people affected by power outages on the east coast due to 
Hurricane Sandy). Five years later New York City residents are still feeling the impact. See 
Oliver Milman, Hurricane Sandy, five years later: ‘No one was ready for what happened after’, 
THE GUARDIAN (Oct. 28, 2017), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2017/oct/27/hurri 
cane-sandy-five-years-later-climate-change [https://perma.cc/YN7V-4HAZ] (speaking to the 
impact of Hurricane Sandy on New York residents and residents of surrounding areas). 
26 GRIMLEY & FARRELL, supra note 11, at 10. 
27 Id.  
28 Id.  
29 Id. at 16.  
30 Id. 
31 See, e.g., Alex Porteshawver, CA Regulations are Hindering Microgrid Development, 
CTR. FOR SUSTAINABLE ENERGY (Aug. 9, 2018), https://energycenter.org/blog/ca-regu 
lations-are-hindering-microgrid-development [https://perma.cc/4GUS-CYUM] 
32 See 21ST CENTURY POWER PARTNERSHIP, AN INTRODUCTION TO RETAIL ELECTRICITY 
CHOICE IN THE UNITED STATES (Aug. 2017), https://www.nrel.gov/docs/fy18osti/68993.pdf 
(“Most retail markets have a rigorous certification, licensing, and registration process for 
retail electric service providers.”). 
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the utility, many consider it technically manageable.33 Finally, legal uncer-
tainty, transaction costs, and technological difficulties can make microgrids 
more expensive than anticipated.34  
As a starting point for reducing barriers to entry, we should create 
clarity within the regulatory regime of exactly what microgrids are and what 
responsibilities they bear, deploy a compensation model that allows adequate 
return on investment and equitable results for consumers, create more 
flexibility in who can own and operate microgrids, and incentivize the 
development of microgrids and DER. It is important to be mindful of overall 
market efficiency in developing this microgrid friendly framework; over 
incentivizing and under-regulating microgrids will have a negative effect on 
energy consumers.35 Beyond the regulatory framework and incentives 
discussed, a plethora of outstanding legal questions exist regarding 
microgrids, including what entities are allowed to operate microgrids, where 
costs are to be recovered from, whether exceptions are to be carved out of 
franchise laws, and how exactly to price island-mode energy services. 
 
I.  IMPORTANCE OF REGULATORY CERTAINTY 
 
An important step toward making microgrids as economically 
effective as possible is improving regulatory certainty to allow effective cost 
planning. As of March, 2016, Connecticut was the only state to have defined 
microgrids within its energy regulation framework.36 “Without explicit 
determination of what a microgrid is and what types of law apply, microgrid 
financiers and developers face a sizeable degree of uncertainty that may deter 
project development.”37 Where microgrids have been developed by third 
parties, especially in California, Pennsylvania, New York, and Connecticut, 
it has been done by obtaining public interest waivers or fitting into standard-
																																								 																				
33 Since 2003 the Institution of Electric and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) has released standards 
for interconnecting distributed generation resources to the main grid. See generally Standards 
Coordinating Committee, IEEE Standard for Interconnecting Distributed Resources with 
Electric Power Systems, IEEE STANDARDS 1 (2003). 
34 CALDWELL, supra note 13. 
35 Negative effects arise from rate-making schemes that charge consumers more in order for 
utilities to gain a return on investment for costs associated with microgrids. Increased costs 
ultimately fall on consumers and should create a net positive result. 
36 See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 16-243(y) (West 2016) (defining microgrids as “a group of 
interconnected loads and distributed energy resources within clearly defined electrical 
boundaries that acts as a single controllable entity with respect to the grid and that connects 
and disconnects from such grid to enable it to operate in both grid-connected or island 
mode.”). This statute includes exemptions from the utility’s franchise. 
37 Jones et al., supra note 6, at 1736. 
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based exceptions within the state’s definition of an electric corporation.38 
Even after evading state regulatory oversight, the industry remains replete 
with risk. For instance, the FTC has warned that utilities may try to raise costs 
or discriminate against third party providers.39 
New York provides a good example of present regulatory uncertainty; it 
is difficult to predict whether a microgrid will be labeled as a public utility by the 
New York Public Service Commission (PSC). The oversight imposed by New 
York on public utilities is fairly standard40 but “because many of these 
mechanisms were developed without microgrids in mind, their application to 
microgrids may not be appropriate.”41 New York asks that microgrids meet the 
criteria of qualifying facilities, a federal concept under Federal Energy Regulatory 
Commission (FERC) management, meant to establish “a new class of generating 
facilities that would receive special rate and regulatory treatment.”42 New York 
borrowed this idea, and allows exemptions from utility regulations for qualifying 
facilities which include specific types of energy production–co-generation, small 
hydro, alternative energy, and related facilities–with an eighty Megawatt energy 
production ceiling.43 These specific forms of generation must serve users at or 
near the project site to receive the exemption. This definition still leads to a large 
degree of ambiguity, in that it is unclear what it means to located at or near a 
project site, a requirement for the qualifying facility exemption.44 The New York 
resiliency report opines that despite the PSC deciding a number of cases dealing 
with this standard, there are no “firm guidelines that can be followed to ensure a 
microgrid project will be exempt.”45 Instead, the PSC offers “different perspec-
tives on what ‘at or near’ might mean in different contexts.”46 
																																								 																				
38 See id. at 1711 (“California's regulations support microgrid implementation as long as the 
microgrid is located on a single piece of property, does not sell electricity to more than two 
tenants on its property, and does not sell electricity to others outside of its property other 
than electric corporations or state agencies.”). 
39 See GRIMLEY & FARRELL, supra note 11, at 30 (“The Federal Trade Commission, too, 
warns New York that utilities will still try to discriminate or raise the costs of third-party 
providers looking to engage in power production and distribution.”). 
40 Jones et al., supra note 6, at 1738. 
41 See NEW YORK STATE ENERGY RESEARCH AND DEV. AUTH. ET AL., MICROGRIDS FOR 
CRITICAL FACILITY RESILIENCY IN NY STATE 28 (2014) [hereinafter “NYSERDA”].  
42 What is a Qualifying Facility?, FED. ENERGY REG. COMM’N, https://www.ferc.gov/industries/ 
electric/gen-info/qual-fac/what-is.asp [https://perma.cc/76UR-EXZC] (last visited Jan. 19, 2017).  
43 NYSERDA, supra note 41, at 29-30 (“This [80 MW] requirement may invite dispute 
where multiple alternate energy sources are located closely together, while being owned by 
separate parties, such as in a microgrid.”). 
44 Id.  
45 Id. at 30.  
46 Id. 
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For non-exempted enterprises, regulation still depends on a three-
pronged analysis 1) whether a section of the New York Public Service Law 
is inapplicable on its face; 2) if facially applicable, whether or not an entity 
can comply; and 3) whether imposing the requirements is necessary to protect 
the public interest or instead would harm the public interest.47 This standard-
based public interest approach leaves investors with more uncertainty, risk, 
and legal and/or regulatory costs than is ideal. Although a public interest 
standard is necessary to protect consumers, a better solution would involve 
guidelines articulated explicitly for microgrid developers. 
Sara Bronin suggests in her 2010 article that Congress require states 
to consider model regulations for microgrids.48 This type of encouraged 
behavior has already led to intrastate interconnection standards which, 
although similar, still retain some differences between states. Even standards 
within states have helped foster microgrids.49 Bronin further recommends 
that states guide localities in how to site and permit microgrid projects.50 The 
need for uniformity and certainty is evidenced by a compelling, though 
admittedly old study: 
 
In 2002, researchers at Carnegie Mellon University interviewed 
utility regulators in eight states to determine how their states 
treated microgrids. They presented the regulators with several 
scenarios, including one in which a for-profit commercial firm 
served twenty customers in an industrial park, as well as a 
cooperative operated by its customers. Of the eight regulators, 
three indicated that microgrids in at least one presented scenario 
could be built, but only one of the three, the representative from 
Minnesota, indicated that small microgrids might be exempt 
from public utility classification and regulation.51 
 
Bronin then presents a model standard, containing a description of 
state alternative energy policy, a definition for microgrids, and a limit on the 
size of unregulated microgrids regarding energy and participants.52 Her 
model for exempting microgrids is, however, missing a provision requiring a 
showing of cost efficiency: if the state is going to grant a microgrid exemption 
from utility regulation, that microgrid should also be improving the market 
																																								 																				
47 Id. at 35. 
48 See generally Bronin, supra note 5. 
49 Id. at 552. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. at 566. 
52 Id. at 578. 
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for the benefit of the consumers. This paper was published in 2010 before 
states began developing cost-benefit tests and frameworks and focuses on 
encouraging states to think about incentivizing microgrids rather than 
structuring the process. 
Movement in the direction of legal and regulatory certainty will drive 
down costs, immediately increasing cost-effectiveness of microgrids. While 
most utilities will not want third parties to be able to distribute energy free of 
regulation, in some states this already happens, and utilities too would benefit 
from being able to plan more effectively around a statutory definition and 
limited exemption for microgrids. 
 
II. EFFECTIVELY EVALUATING COSTS AND BENEFITS OF MICROGRIDS 
 
A. Properly Valuing Resiliency 
 
When regulating and incentivizing resiliency, it is imperative to keep 
in mind the value of resiliency per the specific situation. It is easy to fall into 
the military inspired mindset of survivability above all else, but it is important 
to attach specific economic value to power outage prevention. This can be 
done by placing an economic value on the utility provided to the end users of 
the microgrid and predicting the number of outages per year in that 
geography. Care must be taken in using an appropriate prediction model in 
terms of value and likely outages.  
Military installations were some of the first sites to develop 
microgrids, in large part because resiliency has nearly immeasurable value to 
the military. “Increased use of renewable energy through independent 
microgrids at domestic installations decreases the implications of a cyber 
attack on the commercial electric grid for military preparedness, a crucial 
mission for domestic security.”53 The islanding ability of microgrids may add 
immeasurable value to certain critical facilities such as military bases. 
Beyond that, the value of survivability grows increasingly measurable 
because most facilities contribute predictable value to GDP each day. The 
analysis, however, remains difficult to quantify when personal residences 
rather than commercial buildings are the end users, and when a lack of 
																																								 																				
53 Ashleigh Acevedo, Enlisting Renewable Energy: The Military’s Environmental Excep-
tionalism and a Renewable Energy Initiative in the Face of a National Security Threat, 45 
TEX. ENVTL. L.J. 343, 365. For more information on the military’s use and vision for 
microgrids see generally ELECTRICITY INNOVATION LAB, ROCKY MOUNTAIN INSTITUTE, 
ADVANCING MILITARY MICROGRIDS: CHALLENGES AND RECOMMENDATIONS BASED ON 
INSIGHTS FROM A TWO-DAY WORKSHOP TO SUPPORT NAVAL FACILITIES ENGINEERING 
COMMAND SOUTHWEST’S MICROGRID EFFORTS (2013) (creating potential solutions to 
ensure energy security at U.S. naval bases). 
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electricity poses a safety risk. Furthermore, backup generation must be 
considered as an alternative in considering the costs of a microgrid. State 
initiatives, public utilities, and private actors must attempt to directly measure 
the value of resiliency if they hope to provide value to consumers. 
In order to preserve their political capital, regulators may feel 
compelled to take action regardless of actual economic value in response to 
high profile blackouts. This phenomenon is evident from the strong microgrid 
responses to severe weather around the country, which has had a deadly effect 
over the last decade.54 Providing constituents with a sense of security 
undoubtedly has a value beyond the quantifiable, but apart from critical 
facilities, the rest of the grid should be fortified with an eye toward economics. 
The internet is a good example of the downside to applying military 
priorities to a commercial enterprise. Originally developed by Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), the military adopted an end-
user-controlled model for the internet with the chief priority being 
survivability, as the internet was then a predominantly military resource. As 
the internet has expanded to its present commercial form, it has remained 
wedded to its early protocols, creating economic inefficiency as a price for 
resilience. While the end user-controlled system may have facilitated early 
expansion, it has proven less than ideal for commercial efficiency. The moral 
of the story is that military priorities differ from commercial priorities, and we 
should adopt a model that provides the most value to the energy consumer, 
which may not be the most resilient model. 
One important starting point for assessing the value of resiliency is 
incorporating climate science and actuarial insurance techniques in predicting 
the likelihood of a blackout. The technology and resources presently exist to 
do this analysis. For instance, the Power Outage Annual Report by EATON 
tracks the outages each year.55 An obvious way to predict outages in a certain 
area is to linearly track the outage pattern over enough years. This technique 
is handicapped by the variability of large-scale storms.56 
																																								 																				
54 See NYSERDA, supra note 41, at O-2 (“Extreme weather and other natural disasters can 
threaten lives, disable communities, disrupt economic activities, and lead to the devastation 
of power generation, transmission, and distribution infrastructure. According to the U.S. 
Department of Energy, outages caused by severe weather such as thunderstorms, hurricanes, 
and blizzards account for 58 percent of outages observed since 2002 and 87 percent of 
outages affecting 50,000 or more customers.”). 
55 See generally, EATON, BLACKOUT TRACKER: UNITED STATES ANNUAL REPORT 2015 
(2015), http://www.sustainablepowersystems.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/US_Black 
outTracker_2015_Final.pdf. 
56 See id. at 3 for a list of outages nationally since 2008:  
 
Vol. 4:3]         Providing Optimal Value to Energy Consumers through Microgrids 
	
	
485 
Traditionally, utilities use the “Power System Simulator for Engi-
neering (PSSE) or comparable software to plan utility infrastructure and power 
distribution. PSSE executes dynamic simulations of power transmission so 
engineers can analyze and optimize the grid's performance.”57 Regulators 
should incorporate these outage prediction models in deciding how intensively 
to incentivize microgrid development in general, and for specific locations. It 
is imperative to have a workable means of generating precise values for the 
expected added resiliency. 
 
B. Creating a Model 
 
One issue with creating a cost/benefit model is that “[m]icrogrid designs 
are highly unique. It is difficult to compare or extrapolate benefits and costs from 
one site to another.”58 Because of the small-scale nature of microgrids, the diverse 
nature of DER, and the energy resource differences across the country and even 
within states, standard rules for cost analysis cannot be made to apply to all 
microgrids. Furthermore the facilities served, because of the small scale, will vary 
greatly in the benefits they derive from the microgrid. The extensive and 
individualized cost-benefit analysis required will add an unavoidable, but 
worthwhile, transactional cost to developing a microgrid.  
An initial step is to identify who benefits from the microgrid, as the costs 
should be divided equitably–meaning that costs fall on those who benefit from 
the microgrid. This idea may be more complex than it seems–it is possible for 
consumers outside the microgrid supply area to benefit, for example, due to 
investment savings acquired by the utility. The idea is that equitable cost 
distribution is ethically best and leads to market efficiency.59 Despite the variety 
																																								 																				
 
 
57 Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Predicting electric power outages before they happen, 
SCIENCEDAILY (Sept. 26, 2014), https://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2014/09/14092621 
3548.htm [https://perma.cc/G6PZ-CE6Z]. 
58 NYSERDA, supra note 41, at S-3. 
59 Equity is subjective and cannot be simply measured, but ideally consumers will feel as 
though they get the proper value for their energy costs and will continue to purchase energy 
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of ownership models, whether it is a utility, government entity, non-profit entity, 
or for-profit entity owning the microgrid, “the net benefits and costs . . . are 
constant irrespective of who owns and/or controls the microgrid.”60 The New 
York task force report on grid resiliency developed a cost-benefit analysis tool, 
but opined that “a more expanded version of a benefit cost model should be 
developed that will satisfy the need to account for the full spectrum of costs and 
benefits associated with microgrids.”61 An expansive cost-benefit model should 
be a top priority for regulators, especially given the growth of expensive 
microgrid incentive programs. The New York competition’s model mentioned 
above provides one example. 
While the first concern is that microgrids provide value to consumers, 
it is equally important that the benefits created by the microgrid can be 
monetized to an appropriate degree by the microgrid owner.62 “The ideal 
scenario is one where, over time, mechanisms are created that allow the 
benefits produced by microgrids to be capture [sic] by the microgrid owner to 
incentivize the development of microgrids that provide these and other 
benefits.”63 The graphic below depicts how different levels of benefit capture 
may lead to investment in microgrids:64 
 
																																								 																				
to a societally efficient degree. If consumers are undercharged for the value they derive from 
energy consumption they will over consume and vice versa. 
60  NYSERDA, supra note 41, at 98. 
61 Id. at iii. 
62 Id. at 99. 
63 Id. at 107. 
64 Id. at 108. 
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The New York resiliency report found that microgrids supporting critical 
infrastructure were not usually economically feasible because of the already 
existing backup generation and the high cost of microgrid infra-structure.65 This, 
however, was not true for tightly clustered critical facilities. Beyond the density 
of the load, another important element of cost effectiveness is the ability of the 
microgrid to operate economically more frequently than just during outages. The 
state can manipulate this by changing net metering laws, removing franchise 
restrictions, and encouraging microgrid access to wholesale energy markets, all 
of which appear to cut against public utility goals. Some of these mechanisms 
are not particularly well suited for micro-grids, for instance net metering 
economics are complex with microgrids, and struggle to apply to large microgrid 
projects. For this reason, early cost-effective ventures are likely to be utility run 
or hybrids with a utility partner. Hybrid ventures may, however, be weighed 
down by liability issues arising from any degree of third-party control, meaning 
the utility will require control over key functions in a hybrid situation.66 
Hybrid approaches and non-utility run projects are difficult because they 
require “coordination and shared infrastructure such as piping, distribution lines, 
and monitoring equipment.”67 Some scholarship proposes states “impose 
mandatory microgrid installation in certain small-scale energy districts” in order 
to overcome “lack of coordination.”68 Non-utility microgrids, while potentially 
able to negotiate better terms than a utility microgrid, are constrained by “the 
additional cost of negotiating multiple contracts.”69 Mandating development of 
microgrids is unlikely to be cost effective or provide the best service to 
consumers, as utilities would do so out of fulfillment of obligation rather than 
economic choice. However, if utilities are not going to invest, regulators must 
find a means of allowing non-utilities to effectively compete.  
Maximizing the cost benefit ratio turns in large part on the location of 
the microgrid. The New York resiliency report notes that, unfortunately, “[t]here 
is a lack of information available to potential microgrid developers on site 
characteristics that favor microgrid development.”70 Additionally, the best site 
may not provide the best means of cost recovery, incentivizing suboptimal 
microgrid development. A well sited microgrid has a much better chance of 
social and economic benefit streams to the public, and therefore should be 
associated with private utility.71 
																																								 																				
65 Id. at S-3. 
66 Id. at 134 (noting that, for liability’s sake, utilities want to directly control voltage). 
67 Michael Pappas, Energy Versus Property, 41 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 435, 443 (2014). 
68 Id. at 447. 
69 NYSERDA, supra note 41, at 128. 
70 Id. at S-3. 
71 See id. at 138–43 (providing a detailed cost benefit analysis). 
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III. HOW MICROGRIDS FIT INTO CURRENT REGULATORY FRAMEWORKS 
 
A. Understanding Energy Rate Making 
 
It is important to understand how states set rates for public utilities. The 
retail energy market – selling energy to consumers rather than distributors – is 
heavily regulated. In broad strokes, most states have a public service 
commission (PSC) that makes regulations for public utilities. The PSC also 
reviews annual price proposals from public utilities, which once accepted are 
binding on the utility for the time frame agreed to. These prices are designed 
to ensure that the utility recovers its costs, but also mindful of the public interest 
in not paying unreasonable amounts for electricity or funding unnecessary 
investments. The retail market is distinguishable from wholesale energy 
markets, where energy generators can sell to distributors (and future investors) 
at market determined prices. Part IV(C)(1) of this Comment will elaborate 
upon creative means of facilitating microgrid development via ratemaking and 
Part V will discuss microgrid entrance into wholesale markets, but an early 
explanation is important in order to understand state regulatory schemes.  
 
B. State Incentives and Initiatives 
 
While many states incentivize DER and renewable energy, both 
pertinent to incentivizing microgrid development, few have regulations or 
incentives specifically targeting microgrids.72 A few state initiatives indirectly 
or insubstantially target microgrid deployment, for instance Washington 
“emphasizes small scale [energy] initiatives.”73 Other states place more 
emphasis specifically on microgrids, for instance Oregon exempts smaller 
energy providers from utility regulations and provides limited funding to 
microgrid projects that “demonstrate how energy storage, especially batteries, 
can improve resiliency.”74 New Mexico’s Green Grid Initiatives favor 
distribution that is smart and has microgrids.75 
In 2013 Minnesota released a report commissioned “to identify regu-
latory barriers to and opportunities for microgrid development for energy 
																																								 																				
72 See generally, EPRI, supra note 10. Idaho, Washington, Colorado, Arizona, Nevada, Utah, 
Illinois, Wisconsin, Texas, and Pennsylvania all incentivize renewable and/or DER 
development, and have microgrids within their borders, but have no specific microgrid 
legislation or administrative programs. Many of these states allow net metering (with 
different limits) which can encourage microgrid growth.  
73 Id. at 2-6. 
74 Id. at 2-2. 
75 Id. at 3-19.  
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assurance in the state of Minnesota, with recommendations to address barriers 
and identify pathways to facilitate microgrid development.”76 Minnesota’s 
report is particularly good about noting that microgrids must be “driven by the 
need to deliver value for end users.”77 The report notes that microgrids are not 
typically implemented as one common investment, but “evolve over multiple 
phases, centered on demand and consumption reduction, on-site generation and 
storage, advanced control systems, and automatic grid independence.”78 The 
report provides a chart diagraming revenue sources, development costs, and 
operating expenses for microgrids, and while it describes many ways of 
creating revenue, it does not suggest an optimal method or means of deciding 
which avenue to pursue.79 The report suggests that in the short and “medium-
term” future, utilities are best suited to provide electricity, but that this will 
likely be eroded.80 This report was commissioned in response to severe 
weather, and while pilot projects are distinct in that they are a means to 
information, states should remain vigilant against overcompensating active 
microgrids for uneconomical resiliency. Instead they should focus on the 
economically optimal development of microgrids.81 Ultimately the report 
suggests four policy action steps: defining microgrids within state policy, 
actively encouraging community leaders, ensuring proper valuation of 
microgrid benefits, and incorporating modernization trends into state policy.82 
These proposals advance positive cost-benefit awareness but are general. The 
report could also place more emphasis on creating revenue streams for the 
precise value created by the microgrid. 
A few states have engaged significant resources in funding the 
development and study of microgrids, with the primary purpose of resiliency. 
Massachusetts, as part of a $40 million Community Clean Energy Resilience 
Initiative, included $14 million in grants for energy resilience projects, 
including both microgrids and nanogrids.83 Similarly, New Jersey allocated 
																																								 																				
76 MICHAEL BURR ET AL., MICROGRID INSTITUTE FOR THE MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF 
COMMERCE, MINNESOTA MICROGRIDS: BARRIERS, OPPORTUNITIES, AND PATHWAYS 
TOWARD ENERGY ASSURANCE 7 (2013). 
77 Id. at 62. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. at 70. 
80 Id. at 66. 
81 New York in particular has an advanced cost-benefit model discussed later in this 
Comment. 
82 BURR, supra note 76, at 75. 
83 Baker-Polito Administration Announces $14 Million for Energy Resiliency Grant 
Program, MASS.GOV (Sept. 22, 2016), http://www.mass.gov/eea/pr-2016/14-million-for-
energy-resiliency-grant-program.html [https://perma.cc/E3KA-KWSP]. 
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$25 million in the wake of Sandy to develop microgrids with the goal of 
protecting essential facilities.84 The state has recently allocated $1 million to 
fund community microgrid feasibility studies.85 
Connecticut suffers from especially high brownout rates and energy 
costs, and was one of the earliest to incentivize microgrids via a grant and loan 
pilot program through the Department of Energy and Environmental Protec-
tion.86 These grants are assigned to interconnection projects as well as 
construction projects, and thus far twenty-seven of thirty-six applicants have 
received funding.87 The initial emphasis for Connecticut is on “critical facil-
ities:” “municipal government public safety and wastewater treatment facilities 
as well as grocery stores, hospitals, cell phone towers, and buildings serving as 
shelter – during times when the electric grid goes down.”88 However, the 
definition proceeds to include “regulated market actors, specifically television 
and radio facilities licensed by the Federal Communications Commission” as 
well as “any other facility or area” deemed worthy.89 
Maryland released a task force report on the feasibility of microgrid 
implementation on June 23, 2014. The report detailed a number of recommend-
dations on how to make microgrids fit within its energy regulatory structure, 
discussed in Part IV Subsection B. At the time of the report only utility owned 
public purpose microgrids were legally feasible.90 Importantly, the Maryland 
report establishes the notion that it is not a matter of if another superstorm hits, 
but when and how bad. The next question to analyze, one that New York has ans-
wered well, is to address exactly how much are microgrids worth in that context? 
New York has, in recent years, released a series of initiatives to 
incentivize and prioritize microgrid expansion including its Reforming the 
Energy Vision (REV). “Through regulatory overhaul, REV is remaking  
New York’s utilities to encourage the cleanest, most advanced, and efficient 
power system operation. State programs supporting clean energy are being 
																																								 																				
84 EPRI, supra note 10, at 6-23. 
85 Elisa Wood, New Jersey to Offer Funds for Community Microgrids, MICROGRID KNOW-
LEDGE (Aug. 12, 2016), https://microgridknowledge.com/community-microgrids-3/ [https:// 
perma.cc/4AGS-KW6M]. 
86 EPRI, supra note 10, at 6-9. 
87 Id. at 6-10. The initial round of funding supported diesel projects primarily, while the second 
round of funding focused on renewables and storage. GRIMLEY & FARRELL, supra note 11, at 11. 
88 DEEP Accepting Applications for Microgrid Projects Grants and Loans Available to 
Provide Power to Critical Facilities, CONN. DEPT. OF ENERGY AND ENVTL. PROTECT. (Aug. 
17, 2017), https://www.ct.gov/DEep/cwp/view.asp?A=4918&Q=595114 [https://perma.cc/ 
W49D-LBWC].  
89 Jones et al., supra note 6, at 1750. 
90 See RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at iv (explaining the short-
term versus the long-term energy goals, with third-party microgrids being a long-term goal). 
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redesigned to accelerate market growth and unlock private investment. And 
under REV, New York is deploying innovative energy solutions across State-
owned buildings, university campuses, and State vehicle fleets.”91  
In practice this has meant a number of initiatives, for example, in 2014 
REV launched the “straw proposal,” a coordinating body for deployment of 
DERs on the grid with the goal of morphing utilities into Distributed System 
Platform (DSP) Providers.92 REV is separated into two tracks of initiatives: 
“Track 1 focuses on the development of distributed resource markets and the 
utility as the DSP providers. Track 2 focuses on reforming utility ratemaking 
practices and revenue streams to accommodate the DSP provider model.”93 Many 
stakeholders filed comments with regulators in early 2016, and utility stakehold-
ers and others were “largely supportive” of the regulatory guidance.94 Criticisms 
came from the alternative energy community who thought the utilities should be 
required to provide more comprehensive and more thoroughly vetted reports.95 
One Track 2 proposal for encouraging utility investment in DER is to allow public 
utilities to keep unspent capital budget if they will use it for DER investment even 
though it is typically redistributed to consumers via lower rates per “clawback 
provisions.”96 The overall goal is to transition utilities to profiting through market 
based earnings rather than traditional large-scale energy production. Generally, 
utilities are supportive of the initiative though skeptical of implementation.97 
One part of this comprehensive program is $40 million in prize money 
to fund feasibility studies for municipal microgrids.98 Thus far the program has 
awarded grants to eighty-three studies, fifty-eight more than intended.99 Included 
in the resources available to applicants is a cost-benefit analysis guide, along 
with a cost-benefit spreadsheet, and questionnaire.100 The model provided is 
																																								 																				
91 N.Y. STATE, REFORMING THE ENERGY VISION (Mar. 2016), https://www.ny.gov/sites/ 
ny.gov/files/atoms/files/WhitePaperREVMarch2016.pdf. 
92 Gavin Bade, REV in 2016: The Year that Could Transform Utility Business Models in New 
York, UTILITYDIVE (Jan. 20, 2016), http://www.utilitydive.com/news/rev-in-2016-the-year-that-
could-transform-utility-business-models-in-new-y/412410/ [https://perma.cc/6866-KDSH]. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 GRIMLEY & FARRELL, supra note 11, at 11. 
99 Id. 
100 “The model evaluates the economic viability of a microgrid based on the user’s specification 
of project costs, the project’s design and operating characteristics, and the facilities and services 
the project is designed to support. The model analyzes discrete operating scenarios specified by 
the user; it does not identify an optimal project design or operating strategy.” INDUSTRIAL 
ECONOMICS, INC., supra note 16, at 3. 
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highly dependent on user inputs, and analyzes various scenarios described by the 
user, without specifying an optimal design.101 The model is useful in part 
because it accounts for costs and benefits annualized based on the anticipated 
engineering life with time adjusted values of money (per 2014 dollars).102 The 
worksheet requires that the user specify several key assumptions, including 
“[t]he duration of the major power outage to be analyzed as part of the BCA, the 
probability of an outage of that duration in any year, and the discount rate to be 
employed in calculating present values and annualized values.”103 As mentioned 
in this Comment,104 the outage probability calculations are pivotal to an accurate 
prediction of microgrid benefits, and the New York guide provides an intuitive 
spreadsheet for converting outage probability into time adjusted money.105 
However, this is dependent on developers effectively predicting weather induced 
outages up to twenty years into the future.  
The model has a cost analysis and benefits analysis section.106 It breaks 
cost inputs into initial design and planning, capital investments, operation and 
maintenance, and environmentalism costs.107 It breaks the benefits into energy 
benefits (energy cost savings and capacity cost savings), reliability benefits, 
power quality benefits, environmentalism benefits, and benefits of avoiding 
major power outages, maintaining critical, and other services.108 This system, 
while necessarily reliant on individual inputs, is the most comprehensive 
publicly available guide and effectively walks the line between easily accessible 
and detail oriented. It also incorporates some of the more difficult to quantify 
environmental costs and benefits, by putting values on amounts of greenhouse 
gasses emitted or reduced.109 
 
C. Fitting into Franchise Laws 
 
Franchise laws in the United States protect public utility monopolies on 
energy distribution to varying degrees.110 While no fifty-state survey exists, South 
Carolina and Connecticut provide examples of the broad range of state laws.  
																																								 																				
101 Id. For an example summary worksheet, see id. at 4. 
102 Id.  
103 Id. at 3. 
104 See supra, Section II. 
105 Id. at 5. 
106 Id.  
107 Id. at i. 
108 Id.. 
109 Id. at 22. 
110 Institute for Local Self-Reliance, UTILITY FRANCHISE FEES (2019), https://ilsr.org/ener 
gy/utility-franchise-fees/ [https://perma.cc/A2HC-XZ8K]. 
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In South Carolina, the simple sale of electricity from the owner 
of solar panels installed on a rooftop to the host end user results 
in public utility commission jurisdiction over the sale. By 
contrast, the Connecticut Supreme Court has ruled that, so long 
as no facilities are installed in public streets, extending a 
distribution wire from one parcel to another and selling power 
across that line doesn't encroach on a utility franchise.111  
 
While utilities would like for all energy distributors to be subject to their level 
of regulation, even without this regulation they can still profit via inter-
connection and backup charges on microgrids.112 
New York issued a report in December of 2014 addressing Microgrids 
for Critical Facility Resiliency. The report examined how microgrids fit into 
public utility regulations and provides a representative look at state commission 
rules as applied to microgrids.113 The report concluded that the Public Service 
Commission (PSC) may be able to consider the microgrid a utility and subject to 
Article 4 (public utility) regulations, or consent to reduced regulations due to the 
microgrid’s unique structure and purpose.114 Regulations imposed under Article 4 
include rates, quality of service, general supervision, billing, administration, public 
reports, corporate finance/structure, incorporation, and residential service.115 
Furthermore the microgrid may, but is unlikely to be, required to serve as a 
provider of last resort. New York laws and regulations also stipulate how 
“[n]onutility owned DERs interact with the utility through mechanisms such as 
interconnect rules, standby rates, net-metering laws, and buy-back tariffs. Also, 
there are other mechanisms that are not currently practiced in New York but may 
be considered in the future, such as a ‘microgrid wheeling charge.’”116 Alt-
ernative energy based generation is subject to net metering in New York, while 
fossil fuel generation is not; microgrids that have both renewable and non-
renewable generation may be able to separate the qualifying from the non-
																																								 																				
111 Sara C. Bronin & Paul K. McCary, Peaceful Coexistence, 151 NO. 3 PUB. UTIL. FORT-
NIGHTLY 38, 40 (2013). 
112 See e.g., Jones et al., supra note 6, at 1743 (“NYU does pay for backup services from Con 
Edison. Not only does paying for a standby service benefit NYU, which can operate a simpler 
and cheaper microgrid while having the redundancy of the grid to back it up during system failure, 
but this also provides some financial benefit to Con Edison in regards to recovering fixed costs 
necessary for providing reliable service.”). 
113 NYSERDA, supra note 41.  
114 Id. at 15. 
115 Id. at 16-17. 
116 Id. at 24. A wheeling charge means that the utility could extract payment for facilitating 
the distribution of energy services. 
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qualifying for the purposes of net-metering.117 New York has more progressive 
energy laws than most states, and has taken steps such as the REV to incorporate 
and foster microgrids and DER. Yet, even in New York there is no simple way 
of fitting microgrids into the franchise laws. 
Franchise laws are based on the concept that it is economically best to 
grant an energy distribution monopoly in a given area.118 This theory is losing 
ground as third parties and consumers gain the ability to generate electricity near 
the load.119 Similar to the previously discussed New York programs, Maryland 
has begun initiatives to encourage competition in energy markets:  
 
Accordingly, there has been some movement to allow for 
competition for the provision of on-site generation, which 
combines elements of electric distribution and electric gener-
ation services. Recognizing this shift, the Maryland Public 
Utilities Article exempts parties that provide ‘onsite generated 
electricity’ from regulation as either an electric company . . . or 
electricity supplier.120  
 
Despite this narrow exemption, the Maryland General Assembly would have 
to grant franchise to every third party microgrid.121 While only a few states, 
for instance Maryland, New York, and Connecticut, have taken overt steps to 
weaken and transform franchise laws, the trend is spreading. 
 
IV. DEVELOPING REGULATIONS THAT IMPROVE MARKET EFFICIENCY 
AND ENCOURAGE MICROGRID DEVELOPMENT 
 
A. Why Incentivize 
 
Small-scale distributed generation of energy derived in part from 
renewable sources122 can add strength and stability to the grid and value to the 
consumer. Despite the “troubling effects of large, out-of-the-way develop-
																																								 																				
117 Id. at 38. 
118 Utilites Law and Legal Definition, USLEGAL, https://definitions.uslegal.com/u/utilities-law/ 
[https://perma.cc/S7GH-PNN7] (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) (“Deregulation of the industry has 
recently gained momentum to allow more competition in providing electricity to customers.”). 
119 New York’s REV initiative is an example of regulators accommodating and encouraging 
generation of energy from third parties and requiring/encouraging utilities to incorporate that 
energy into its infrastructure. 
120 RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 41. 
121 Id. at 45. 
122 Many microgrids are installed with gas-generation to add certainty of operation while islanded. 
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ments, government continues to direct significant support to projects with 
many hundreds or thousands of end users.”123 Studies suggest that through 
microgrids users can save twenty to twenty-five percent in energy costs over 
individually owned distributed generation.124 Microgrids offer the potential for 
an economically favored middle ground between individualized power supply 
and our current macrogrid,125 though it is one that requires complex cost-
benefit analysis for realization. 
Regulations should incentivize peer-to-peer controls of new micro-
grids. “The peer-to-peer controls of the Santa Rita Jail allow the grid to self-
heal and, perhaps most importantly, easily add new distributed energy 
without having to completely redesign the control system. The result of peer-
to-peer control technology is a more sustainable and adaptable microgrid.”126 
States are only beginning to develop microgrid policy and utilities are in the 
early stages of implementation, and mindfulness of technology options such 
as peer-to-per controls is extremely important. 
 
B. Intelligently Dismantling Protectionism and Reallocating Value 
 
An initial step toward encouraging investment in microgrids is 
intelligently scaling back protections of public utilities. One, albeit flawed, 
means of providing value to microgrid owners, at the potential expense of 
utilities, is net metering which gives monetary credit for energy put onto the 
grid. As previously mentioned, microgrids do not fit well into net metering 
schemes when they use non-renewable sources and are relatively large in 
scale.127 The energy cap on net metering credits should be set at a carefully 
decided value, weighing the interests of encouraging cost-effectiveness in the 
																																								 																				
123 Bronin, supra note 5, at 556. 
124 Id. at 563 (citing Douglas E. King, Electric Power Micro-grids: Opportunities and 
Challenges for an Emerging Distributed Energy Architecture 3, 47 (May 2006) (unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation) (on file at Carnegie Mellon University, https://www.scribd.com/docu 
ment/22903781/Electric-Power-Micro-grids-PhDThesis200-good-6 [https://perma.cc/66ZH 
-UWCC])). This study looked at San Diego and tracked the percent savings from installing 
DER resources and then the additional percent savings from compiling those DER into a 
microgrid. 
125 The current values created by microgrids being reduced power outages, reduced grid 
sourced energy, heating fuel, sale of ancillary services to macrogrid, sale of excess energy, 
demand response programs, and credits for pollutant reduction, while the costs include 
equipment, installation, interconnection, operation, fuel expense, (less incentives), and 
regulatory expenses. See CALDWELL, supra note 13. See also EPRI, supra note 10, at 1–3 
(providing a comprehensive list of costs and benefits of microgrids). 
126 GRIMLEY, supra note 11, at 14. 
127 See supra, Section II.B. 
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effected microgrids without overly disrupting utility function. Some commen-
tators take a different tact, arguing that “[t]o encourage microgrids and, with 
them, resiliency, any net metering limit based on expected electrical consum-
ption should be removed.”128 The author notes that caps are based on utility 
protectionism “rather than on the need for grid stability or reliability.”129 How-
ever, protecting utilities to a degree is necessary for grid stability at least in the 
short term. Ultimately, regulators must envision a path to cost recovery for 
utilities while encouraging microgrid development. New York has realized this 
with its REV goal of transitioning utilities to compilers of DERs. 
Microgrids often generate value streams, ancillary services, and social 
benefits like reduced emissions,130 yet our regulations do not provide mechan-
isms for owner compensation. As previously mentioned, certain states 
including New York, New Jersey, Connecticut, and California have begun 
specifically funding microgrid development. Congress has gotten involved to 
a limited extent, but has not explicitly directed funds toward microgrids: 
“Under the Disaster Relief Appropriations Act of 2013, Congress made a total 
of $16 billion available through the CDBG fund . . . to sponsor ‘disaster relief, 
long-term recovery, restoration of infrastructure and housing, and economic 
revitalization.’”131 
Utilities may face regulatory challenges owning distributed generation 
(DG) inside the infrastructure of microgrids. Explicitly allowing utility 
ownership of DG “might encourage utility microgrid development by reducing 
obstacles to the full utility microgrid model.”132 This allowance should be 
dependent on providing rate payer benefits, meaning that regulators should not 
stifle non-utility microgrid investment. The New York resiliency report 
suggests that the exception be “contingent on providing substantial ratepayer 
benefits via the provision of safety and security benefits through serving 
critical infrastructure in scenarios where nonutility investment is unlikely.”133 
In 2014 Maryland released a task force report on Resiliency through 
Microgrids which, true to its title, focused on the resiliency benefits of 
microgrids, but unfortunately paid much less mind to cost-benefit analyses 
than did the New York report. Maryland stated its purpose as twofold:  
 
																																								 																				
128 Payne, supra note 9, at 178. 
129 Id. 
130 Reduced emissions are, too an extent, compensated via cap-in-trade programs that award 
Reduced Emission Completions (RECs). 
131 Jones et al., supra note 6, at 1726 (citing Disaster Relief Appropriations Act, Pub. L. No. 
113-2, 127 Stat. 4 (2013). 
132 NYSERDA, supra note 41, at 136. 
133 Id. 
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First, Maryland should focus on the development of geograph-
ically dispersed, dynamic, and resilient public purpose micro-
grid projects throughout the State. . . . Second, Maryland’s 
public purpose microgrid grants should assist projects that will 
serve as case studies for the coordination between regulators, 
policymakers, local governments, utilities, and other relevant 
entities in order to identify opportunities, barriers, and risks to 
the development of future public purpose microgrids and 
distributed energy systems.134  
 
Maryland suggests that more robust cost-benefit analysis could be done, but 
regardless of the awareness, the report could do more to emphasize the 
centrality of a cost-benefit analysis system to any regulatory framework. 
Still, the Maryland report developed useful recommendations for 
advancing microgrid policy. The task force recommended that the state, in 
the short term, encourage the deployment of utility owned public purpose 
microgrids with advocacy and incentives. It assessed current law and found 
that it likely granted authority to the Maryland PSC to allow public utility 
microgrids. Importantly, the report recommended that Maryland “conduct a 
holistic analysis of tariffs that help define the value of distributed generation 
to the macrogrid, as well as engage in a comprehensive review of siting, 
interconnection, and commissioning procedures,” an important step in 
developing an efficient market.135 
The task force then recommended a long term approach of reducing 
barriers to third parties trying to invest in “public purpose microgrid services 
to multiple customers” even if this is done redundantly over existing 
distribution. While more study needs to be done to strike an appropriate 
balance, the task force believed that allowing private microgrids can “[i]ncent 
innovation, provide better reliability and resiliency to its citizens, and still 
allow traditional utilities to compete.”136 This recommendation strikes at the 
inherent tension in microgrid development, between incentivizing and 
allowing private microgrids in the energy marketplace and protecting the 
traditional and highly regulated public energy utilities. The balance proposed 
by Maryland is intelligent but requires fleshing out with structures to ensure 
continued utility cost recovery in the face of third-party entrants. 
 
																																								 																				
134 RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS TASK FORCE, supra note 1, at 22. 
135 Id. at i–ii. 
136 Id. at ii. 
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C. Rate Making for Microgrids 
	
1. Applying General Rate Making Principles to Microgrid Policy 
 
State energy commissions face a plethora of options, each with pros and 
cons, in setting energy rates. An initial decision, for utility-owned microgrids, is 
to determine what a microgrid is for the purpose of ratemaking. The answer to 
this question will help inform rate makers on whether to include costs in the 
general rate base or charge a tariff directly to the direct microgrid beneficiaries. 
At first blush it seems as though a tariff is much more reasonable, however, 
installing the microgrid may save all consumers money by replacing upgrades the 
utility would have had to install.137 Alternatively, states such as Maryland and 
New York have expressed interest in transitioning to a system that better incorpor-
ates DG and where utilities take on more of an aggregator and distributor role.138 
Rate-making can also be used proactively to force utilities to consider 
microgrid development. In the wake of Superstorm Sandy Con Edison filed with 
the NYPSC to raise rates to fund traditional methods of “storm hardening” the 
grid. In response, the PSC rejected the traditional approach and ordered Con 
Edison to “take specific steps to pursue integration of DG resources in its service 
territory and to investigate the feasibility of microgrid installations.”139 On 
February 21, 2014, the PSC approved a four-year billion dollar plan to strengthen 
its systems and required Con Edison to “develop an implementation plan for a 
microgrid pilot project,” and “[d]evelop and apply a cost/benefit analysis 
approach for future capital investment that . . . assesses the relative benefits and 
costs of resilience of existing utility infrastructure and alternative resilience 
approaches such as microgrids.”140 Not only did rate-makers use their authority 
to encourage investigation and investment, they did so in a way that assessed 
market based cost-benefit analysis, including the value of resilience. Because of 
their regulatory authority over public utilities, state PSCs are in a unique position 
to require the development of infrastructure most beneficial to the consumer, as 
was done here. 
																																								 																				
137 See, e.g., Borrego Springs, MICROGRIDS AT BERKELEY LABS (2019), https://building-
microgrid.lbl.gov/borrego-springs [https://perma.cc/7FA7-2F27] (last visited Jan. 21, 2017) 
(showing that the Borrego Springs Project–a joint venture with the utility providing 
distribution and private enterprises providing generation–provides “a potential alternative to 
building additional transmission capacity”). 
138 NYSERDA, supra note 41, at 122; see also RESILIENCY THROUGH MICROGRIDS TASK 
FORCE, supra note 1, at 34–5 (deciding whether to charge consumers for additional services 
or “recover distribution system upgrade costs from its entire rate base”). 
139 Nostrand, supra note 23, at 124. 
140 Jones et al., supra note 6, at 1734. 
Vol. 4:3]         Providing Optimal Value to Energy Consumers through Microgrids 
	
	
499 
Commentators have suggested the use of multiple doctrines common to 
rate making jurisprudence to promote DG and microgrid investment. For 
example, the standard of prudence in rate regulation could require utilities to 
investigate the benefits of DG investment. Additionally, the used and useful 
doctrine could “come into play as a legal tool for promoting DG resources by 
demonstrating that these resources are a means of avoiding the ‘lumpiness’ 
associated with the central generation model.”141 The author here further 
contends that cost-causation principles applied to “just and reasonable” rates 
could be used to encourage DG, because regulators could require rates that 
reflect the (hotly-debated) benefits of DG resources.142 Another means of 
encouraging microgrid growth is to encourage their participation in 
competitive wholesale energy markets, with these rates set by market forces 
rather than regulators. 
 
2. Recent DER Rate Making Models 
 
In November of 2016 the National Association of Regulatory Utility 
Commissioners (NARUC) released a manual on Distributed Energy Resource 
(DER) rate design. While this doesn’t directly address rate design for microgrids, 
the principles correlate because the microgrids best suited to provide resiliency 
and to add renewable resources to the grid are fed primarily by DER. Still, there 
will be subtle differences in rate-making decisions from the amalgamating 
function and requisite infrastructure of microgrids as opposed to DER.  
An initial question addressed by the manual is whether to create different 
classes of energy customers, or to change all rates with the implementation of 
DER. “In the case of DER-owning customers, there is now a group of customers 
that differs significantly in both usage patterns and the effects of rate levels on 
decision making from others in the same class.”143 The manual advises against a 
flat volumetric charge, because this runs the risk of revenue erosion. It also advises 
that equitable cost distribution based on consumption and benefits is good for both 
market efficiency and equity. It is also important that the price signifies the cost of 
the energy.144 However, if rate makers choose demand based charges, which come 
																																								 																				
141 Nostrand, supra note 23, at 140. Here lumpiness refers to the way utilities typically add 
energy generation, in large chunks, whereas DG investment will allow an energy addition 
precisely tailored to the needs of the consumers. 
142 Id. at 155. 
143 NARUC, supra note 4, at 86. 
144 The manual offers regulators questions to ask when deciding whether to transfer customers to 
a new rate schedule: 1) Do DER customers have a unique service, usage, or cost characteristic 
that should be tracked by a separate rate class? 2) Are there currently or are there expected to be 
a sufficient number of customers to justify a new rate class? 3) Does the utility provider have 
                                   Journal of Law & Public Affairs                [May 2019 
	
	
500 
with revenue certainty and rate recovery but no price signal, they must encourage 
education of consumers on how they’re being charged.145 
While net metering was discussed earlier as a positive incentive for the 
development of microgrids and consumer owned DER, a poorly tailored net 
metering system will unduly harm utilities. Often, net metering does not 
account for negative metering (selling more to the grid than the customer takes 
off). Furthermore, net metering, if it is to encourage market efficiency, must 
distinguish between the value of energy and the cost of the service of providing 
energy (the utility charges a higher rate than the value of the energy because it 
incurs the costs of providing the service). Net metering schemes must account 
for the time and location value of energy: the value added to the grid should 
correspond with the amount earned through the net metering scheme. 
The NARUC manual provides three valuation methodologies, value of 
resource, value of service, and transactive energy. The value of resource 
method separates costs and benefits of utility services derived from DER 
systems from values derived from other utility services.146 The value of service 
methodology treats the distribution grid as network, with each piece adding a 
quantifiable value to the whole.147 Finally, the manual offers a more innovative 
and new valuation method, called transactive energy (TE):  
 
TE is both a technical architecture and an economic dispatch 
system highly reliant on price signals, robust development of 
technology on both the grid side and the customer side, and rules 
allowing for markets to develop that enable a wide variety of 
participants to provide services directly to each other. This ‘peer-
to-peer’ component differentiates TE from many of the other 
options discussed herein.148 
																																								 																				
sufficient capability/technology (such as metering/billing) to separate the customers and bill them 
differently? Id. at 90. Different states have taken different approaches: California offered a 20 
year grandfathering period for current customers of its Net Energy Metering program, Kansas 
created a 15 year grandfathering period from 2014 to 2029 for renewable owners, and Nevada 
created a 20 year period for customers with applications installed before 2016. Id. at 93. 
145 Id. at 99. Utilities can also recover cost via standby charges, backup charges, 
interconnection fees, and metering charges. “The advantages of an interconnection fee or a 
metering charge are usually based on principles of cost causation. The cost of the DER 
connecting to the distribution system and the cost of metering services for that DER is 
charged to the customer imposing those costs.” Id. at 125. 
146 Id. at 133. 
147 Id. at 136. 
148 NARUC, supra note 4, at 139. This method is the least developed but may provide the most 
promise for “enabling new compensation models, including fee-based models.” Id. at 140-41. 
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There are many factors in deciding what rate scheme and valuation 
methodology a rate maker should choose. The NARUC manual is a useful 
resource, and it is important to keep in mind the individual priorities and 
circumstances of the state when deciding a rate system.149 New York released 
a staff report on October 27, 2016 for the purpose of developing “accurate 
pricing for DERs that reflects the actual value DERs create.”150 Similar to the 
NARUC manual, New York placed high value on accurate price signals, for 
the purpose of monetizing products and “ensuring efficient market oper-
ations.”151 New York plans to initially create an interim methodology to value 
DER (VDER), and immediately begin developing a more nuanced “Phase Two 
VDER” methodology.152 The goals for this methodology are parallel to the 
thrust of this Comment, that we should encourage a gradual, market-sensitive, 
transition toward microgrids (although the New York report deals with DER 
rather than microgrids explicitly) using a predictable and certain framework. 
Hopefully, New York’s final methodology embodies its foundational goals. 
 
V. ENCOURAGING MICROGRIDS THROUGH  
ENERGY STORAGE REGULATION 
 
One of the largest remaining technological and regulatory barriers to 
microgrid development is energy storage technology. Microgrids often rely on 
DERs, which fluctuate in production. Energy storage provides stability to 
intermittent energy flow, supplements the resilience of these microgrids, and 
even resupplies the macrogrid during periods of high demand.153 The ability to 
sell storage back to the grid, via wholesale energy markets or net metering 
schemes would provide microgrids a useful means of cost recovery. Today, 
“[e]nergy storage comes in a variety of packages, including lithium ion batteries, 
																																								 																				
149 See id. at 143-47, 151-55 (providing a list of questions to support a regulator, as well as 
information on rate design and costs-benefit analysis). 
150 DEPT. OF PUBLIC SERVICE, STAFF REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN THE VALUE OF 
DISTRIBUTED ENERGY RESOURCES PROCEEDING 4 (Oct. 27, 2016). 
151 Id. at 6. 
152 See id. at 13 (“At a minimum, the Phase One methodology should establish a valuation 
and compensation foundation that can evolve as new knowledge and capabilities are 
developed. It should also recognize environmental attributes, while providing for a market 
transition consistent with the principles of gradualism and predictability.”). 
153 See Samantha Ruiz, Katie R. Thomas, and Kevin B. Jones, Promoting Clean Reliable 
Energy through Smart Technologies and Policies: Lessons from Three Distributed Energy 
Case Studies, 6 SAN DIEGO J. CLIMATE & ENERGY L. 39, 65 (2014-2015) (noting that the 
Kauai Island Utility Cooperative (KIUC) “continues to implement sufficient battery storage 
to ensure necessary reinforcement for its intermittent renewables”). 
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flywheels, compressed air, and pumped hydro projects.”154 States are beginning 
to recognize the benefits of increased storage capacity and improved technology; 
for example, California passed a mandate in 2013 that investor owned utilities 
“install 1,325 MW in energy storage projects by 2020.”155 
Before regulators can effectively allow participation of microgrids with 
energy storage in energy markets, they must define storage within energy 
regulations. Storage poses a regulatory challenge in that it does not fit cleanly 
into current energy regulation definitions, therefore it is hindered by regulatory 
uncertainty and the potential for generation or distribution regulations. Some 
states have begun addressing this deficiency in a myriad of ways. Arkansas 
defines solar as well as solar plus storage; Kansas and Kentucky deal with 
storage in interconnection agreements; Michigan provides RECs for systems 
with “advanced electric storage technology.”156 North Carolina, on the other 
hand, has hitched a rational though burdensome anchor to storage development 
by prohibiting “gaming,” charging a battery during off peak hours then putting 
electricity back into the system during peak demand.157  
In its report on microgrids for grid resiliency, Maryland acknowledged 
the benefits of battery storage for renewable energy systems and the grid. 
Maryland noted the “quick dispatch nature of battery storage, meaning the 
ability to push or pull power very quickly, makes distributed energy storage 
very attractive to grid operators, energy developers, and system hosts alike.”158 
Storage will very likely play an important role in easing the transition from 
present day centralized generation toward more reliance on distributed 
generation, including microgrids. 
FERC has recently noted that “market rules designed for traditional gen-
eration resources can create barriers to entry for emerging technologies.”159 On 
																																								 																				
154 Id. at 52. For more information on these technologies, see Energy Storage Technologies, 
ENERGY STORAGE ASS’N (last visited Jan. 21, 2017), http://energystorage.org/energy-storage/ 
energy-storage-technologies [https://perma.cc/ZW24-YM5V] (providing additional detail on 
how these technologies function).  
155 Ruiz et. al, supra note 153, at 52. For three case studies representing different models, see 
generally id. (examining as case studies the distributed energy models of San Diego Gas & 
Electric, the Sacramento Municipal Utility District, and the Kauai Island Utility Cooperative).  
156 Payne, supra note 9, at 171. 
157 See id. (“North Carolina views this as an illegal manipulation of a time-of-use tariff.”). 
158 See MARYLAND ENERGY ADMINISTRATION TASK FORCE, RESILIENCY THROUGH MICRO-
GRIDS TASK FORCE REPORT 24 (last visited Mar. 24, 2019) (“[G]rid operators are given another 
tool to keep the lights on, developers can offer customers a better product, and Maryland’s 
businesses and homeowners can potentially island from the grid during outages”). 
159 Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organi-
zations and Independent Systems Operation, 157 FERC ¶ 61,121, 11 (proposed Nov. 17, 
2016) (to be codified at 18 CFR pt. 35). 
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November 17, 2016, FERC released a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking 
(NOPR), to amend its regulations under the Federal Power Act “to remove 
barriers to the participation of electric storage resources and distributed energy 
resource aggregations in the capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets 
operated by regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent 
system operators (ISO).”160 The NOPR proposes to “require RTOs and ISOs 
to revise their tariffs to 1) establish a participation model for electric storage 
resources in wholesale electric markets and 2) define DER aggregators as 
participants in wholesale electric markets under a model that best accomm-
odates the physical and operational characteristics” of DER.161 
FERC notes the many benefits of including electric storage resources 
in the organized wholesale markets, including more efficient operation of 
thermal generation, improved reliability, congestion relief, integration of 
variable energy resources, and lessening the burden on the transmission 
system.162 FERC failed to mention microgrids, but by including storage 
facilities into electric markets, the commission will increase the ability for 
microgrids to recover costs, spurring their development. The NOPR goes on to 
note the present inclusion of storage by various RTOs and ISOs around the 
country, including MISO, NISO, PJM, and SPP.163  
While the NOPR was not designed for the purpose of microgrids, it 
gives note to a potential effect, stating that the market participation agreement 
proposed for DER aggregators should not prevent microgrids from partici-
pating in wholesale electric markets.164 The country is in the midst of energy 
storage regulatory reform at the state and national level, and it is important that 
this reform be mindful of its impact on microgrid development, as energy 
storage will play an increasing role in microgrid development. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
 The purpose of this Comment is to spin a tale of cautionary optimism. 
Microgrids offer an incredible array of potential societal benefits–incorporation 
of renewable energy into the grid, resilience against natural and human attacks 
on energy systems, and greenhouse emission reduction, to name just a few. The 
aim is to caution against overvaluing or failing to take proper care in valuing 
																																								 																				
160 Id. at 1.  
161 Id. 
162 Id. at 23. 
163 See id. at 23-24 (describing the roles that these listed ISOs and RTOs allow energy storage 
to play). 
164 Id. at 119. 
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these benefits. For all their promise, microgrids are costly and disruptive165 
endeavors, and regulators must avoid wearing rose colored glasses as they 
encourage microgrid development. With that being said, most states do not do 
enough to allow microgrid developers to be compensated for all the benefits that 
microgrids create. If these revenue streams became available, microgrids would 
become more cost effective to develop, leading to a more optimal grid and 
maximum benefit to the consumer. 
	
 
																																								 																				
165 Microgrids are disruptive in that they can, if carelessly developed, hinder public utilities 
ability recuperate costs, driving up energy costs for average consumers. 
